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Islamists in Democratic Elections: Threat or Solution? 
Anne Marie Baylouny ∗ 
In countries making the transition to democracy, the question of which groups will 
contest the elections is one of the most pressing. Should radical or religious parties be 
excluded from taking part in national elections? Specifically, how will Islamist1 groups 
act in democratic societies? 
Fears of an electoral victory by an Islamist party which then repeals the democratic 
system itself—following the progression “one person, one vote, one time”—have been 
invoked to justify the wholesale and brutal repression of opposition movements in the 
Arab world which use the rhetoric of Islam. To date, this fear has not been historically 
confirmed. The Iranian revolution occurred in an authoritarian regime, and Algeria’s 
elections were canceled prior to their completion. Indeed, Islamists have participated 
electorally in several authoritarian countries in the Arab world, regimes characterized 
by varying degrees of political openness such as Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt. In other 
regions of the world—South and Southeast Asia for example—Muslims regularly par-
ticipate in electoral politics.2 
I argue here that repression and exclusion of Islamists has increased support for 
those opposition groups, and that by contrast, democratic inclusion holds powerful 
institutional incentives that tame opposition movements and marginalize those who 
reject the democratic system as a whole. This model holds equally well in the case of 
Islamist parties. 
                                                                        
∗ Anne Marie Baylouny is Assistant Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, 
CA. The views expressed in this article are the author’s alone and do not represent the Naval 
Postgraduate School or any other institutional affiliation. 
1 Islamism, or political Islam, is often called Islamic fundamentalism, and can be defined as a 
movement or person that uses Islam as part of a political agenda. 
2 See the review by Vickie Langohr, “Of Islamists and Ballot Boxes: Rethinking the Relation-
ship between Islamisms and Electoral Politics,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 
33 (2001). She quotes Lisa Anderson, writing that, while we do not know whether Islamist 
governments would act democratically, we have substantial evidence that the current regimes 
clearly do not (608). 
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Social Movements and Democracy 3 
The basic idea behind democracy is simple: democratic systems induce players to work 
within the bounds of legality, since the chances of winning a fair democratic election 
far outweigh any possibility of overthrowing the system. Political entrepreneurs are 
enticed by the prospect of holding office, including situations when their movement 
cannot win even a plurality of seats. At the same time, a fair and open process de-le-
gitimizes those who use violence and reject the system itself, isolating them and pre-
venting radical, regime-rejecting groups from gaining more adherents. Hezbollah’s 
recent experience demonstrates this. While obtaining a relatively small percentage of 
offices in Lebanon, the group has maintained its commitment to democratic politics 
and re-formulated its end-state goals in the process.4 
A scant few centuries ago, the concept of allowing the “masses” a voice in govern-
ment was met with near universal alarm by the elite. As more classes of people de-
manded and secured suffrage, the elite saw that it had nothing to fear electorally: the 
masses did not take over the property of the rich, but voted instead for opportunities to 
become rich themselves. The electorate utilized the permitted means of expression 
rather than overthrowing the system itself. Thus it has been said that the ballet box is 
the coffin of radicalism. 
So it has been with protest historically. Attacks by workers declined as union activ-
ity and strikes were legalized.5 The authorities began to understand that allowing some 
protest along pre-determined lines decreased the use of violent and disruptive tactics. 
Unions and opposition parties could be accommodated within the institutions of the 
system, allowing for a degree of cooptation along with inclusion. Similarly, rent strikes 
and disruptive demonstrations by the poor declined as legal organizations arose to rep-
                                                                        
3 Social movements are sustained challenges that make public claims against power holders, 
on behalf of particular groups. Sidney Tarrow, “Political Protest and Social Change: 
Analyzing Politics,” American Political Science Review 90:4 (1996); Charles Tilly, “From 
Interactions to Outcomes in Social Movements,” in How Social Movements Matter, ed. 
Marco Giugni, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1999); Charles Tilly, “Social Movements and National Politics,” in State-Making and 
Social Movements: Essays in History and Theory, ed. Charles Bright and Susan Harding 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1984). My analysis here draws on the classics of 
social movement theory, especially works by Charles Tilly, Sidney Tarrow, and Doug 
McAdam. 
4 The group altered its objectives to accommodate the presence of Christians in Lebanon. 
Muhammad Hussayn Fadlallah, “Interview: Islamic Unity and Political Change,” Journal of 
Palestine Studies 25:1 (Autumn 1995). 
5 Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978), 158.   
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resent their constituencies.6 In Italy, for a decade after the mid-1960s, terrorism took 
place alongside what would prove to be the more enduring trend, that of institutional-
izing social movements’ demands into formal, legitimate, and non-violent organiza-
tions.7 The democratic system responded to the presence of new groups by including 
them, thus ensuring the long-term survival of the system through the isolation and 
eventual demise of groups working violently outside fair and open institutions.8 Italy’s 
Red Brigade is one such example; the Weathermen in the United States are another. 
During particular eras, protest in democratic polities may become so rampant it that 
appears to be on the verge of overwhelming society’s established institutions. This is 
the peak of the protest cycle. As the cycle winds down, organized movements capture 
the demands voiced by protesters. The demands are then moderated and formulated so 
that they can be accommodated within current institutional channels. In the end, ac-
cording to Tarrow, it was not the police that ended terrorism in Italy, but the institu-
tionalization of the social movements out of which the terrorists had sprung. For the 
hold-outs, isolated from community support, it was just a matter of time before the 
terrorist trend died out.9 In democracies that resist the pull of indiscriminate or collec-
tive repression, terrorism does not threaten the existence of the system itself; violence 
will continually spiral toward its demise, losing allies and support as democratic insti-
tutions expand to include new social actors. Indeed, terrorist movements in most de-
mocracies have proved to be short-lived.10 
                                                                        
6 Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, “Normalizing Collective Protest,” in Frontiers 
in Social Movement Theory, ed. Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 1992); Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Poor 
People’s Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail (New York: Pantheon Books, 
1977). Although the authors lament this dynamic of cooptation, it does demonstrate the 
power of democratic inclusion to check radical or militant groups. 
7 Defining terrorism is a difficult and politically charged task. Here I take the definition of 
terrorism as the violent targeting of non-combatants by groups that are challenging the politi-
cal status quo. State terrorism, or intentional violence against civilians by state or govern-
ment authorities, is an analytically distinct phenomenon. Terrorism is a tactic. Thus, judg-
ments of events as terrorist or not are theoretically separate from characterizations of the ac-
tors themselves and the justness of their cause. As Sederberg argues, the means used should 
not be confused with the actors. See Robert V. Keeley, “Trying to Define Terrorism,” Middle 
East Policy 9:1 (2002); Peter C. Sederberg, “Global Terrorism: Problems of Challenge and 
Response,” in The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls, ed. Charles 
W. Kegley, Jr. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003). 
8 Donatella Della Porta and Sidney Tarrow, “Unwanted Children: Political Violence and the 
Cycle of Protest in Italy, 1966–1973,” European Journal of Political Research 14 (1986); 
Sidney Tarrow, Democracy and Disorder: Protest and Politics in Italy 1965-1975 (New 
York: Clarendon Press, 1989), 317–37. 
9 Della Porta and Tarrow, “Unwanted Children”; Tarrow, Democracy and Disorder, 317–37. 
10 Ted Robert Gurr, “Terrorism in Democracies: When It Occurs, Why It Fails,” in The New 
Global Terrorism, ed. Kegley, Jr. 
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Authoritarian Systems: A Different Framework 
Non-democratic systems alter this dynamics. Theoretically, repression was believed to 
remove one of the main pillars of social movements, namely, political opportunity. 
Under rational choice theory, the individual assessment of costs and benefits in an en-
vironment of likely repression was believed to lead a rational individual to refrain from 
social activism and protest. While tight and elegant, this theory cannot explain the nu-
merous occurrences of activism throughout history, or the willingness of individuals to 
die for causes they believe in—a goal praised by Hollywood and the military alike. The 
American Revolution, for one, was not without costs. It began with protests and dem-
onstrations, including a certain riot over tea in Boston. 
Social scientists began to deal with this reality, admitting that they did not know 
when repression deterred and when it incited protest. In some situations, repression by 
the authorities could be an “opportunity” or incentive to increase mobilizing that would 
likely end in repression.11 In resolving this quandary, the concept of repression must be 
disaggregated: the state’s use of sanctions against popular activism is not of a piece. 
Access and mobilizing potential are variable: Nazi and Communist groups are out-
lawed in some Western democracies, while other groups allied to the state obtain in-
stitutional access in otherwise closed regimes. Indeed, a black/white distinction be-
tween authoritarian versus democratic regimes is inaccurate. Wholesale exclusion is 
not characteristic of all authoritarian states, nor is unfettered inclusion the rule for de-
mocracies.12 States regularly decide what groups and institutional avenues will be per-
mitted. Police treat protesters differentially, targeting some and ignoring others. Au-
thorities turn a blind eye to some challenger social groups, only to unleash the police 
against the same groups at a later date, as has been the fate of Islamist movements 
throughout the Middle East. The Right in the Middle East—especially the Islamist 
Right—was allowed a free hand, and in some cases was even unleashed to destroy the 
Left on behalf of the state. Many current Islamist movements are heirs to this near-uni-
versal policy of tolerance by Arab regimes. In Northern Ireland, armed militias on the 
side of the state received special treatment, and remained exempt from the ravages 
wreaked on Catholic opposition groups.13 Thus, merely positing state repression as a 
                                                                        
11 Jack A. Goldstone and Charles Tilly, “Threat (and Opportunity): Popular Action and State 
Response in the Dynamics of Contentious Action,” in Silence and Voice in the Study of 
Contentious Politics, ed. Ronald R. Aminzade, et al. (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001). 
12 Donatella Della Porta, “Social Movements and the State: Thoughts on the Policing of 
Protest,” in Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, 
Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, ed. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and 
Mayer N. Zald (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, 
Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2002). 
13 Robert W. White, “Comparing State Repression of Pro-State Vigilantes and Anti-State 
Insurgents: Northern Ireland, 1972–75,” Mobilization 4:2 (1999). 
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causal variable cannot identify the effects of this repression on different groups in soci-
ety. State-group interactions must first be differentiated according to who and when, 
challenger status and time period. 
Furthermore, perceptions of legitimacy are integral to social movement trajectories. 
While legitimacy is a subjective or “fuzzy” concept for social science, it continually 
pops up, even for analysts who eschew the use of interpretive variables. Considerations 
of what is in an individual’s best interests alter when repression is deemed illegitimate 
by the community. Although state repression is intended to negatively affect mobiliz-
ing, strong group support can not only cancel but even reverse that influence.14 Using 
mathematical models to analyze state-protester interactions, studies have found that 
coercion increased protest, lending credence to a “backlash” interpretation of repres-
sion.15 In a path-breaking analysis of Islamist-state interactions in Egypt and Algeria, 
Hafez found that the precision of repression, whether targeted or indiscriminate, had a 
powerful effect on militarizing opposition movements in those countries.16 Random 
repression detracts from the regime’s legitimacy, creating an insurgent consciousness 
or injustice frame,17 through the well-known dynamics of making innocent civilians 
into martyrs, victims of arbitrary police coercion. In game theory terminology, 
indiscriminate repression violates the clarity of the authorities’ signals. Citizens are 
unsure what activities will provoke state coercion. Seemingly benign activities may be 
repressed or the populace may be repressed collectively. In this atmosphere, to protest 
or not to protest can bring about the same result, and thus, the incentive to stay within 
the system disappears. Troublemakers and law-abiders alike become the object of the 
coercive arm of the state. This is a practical argument against collective and 
indiscriminate punishment, aside from any moral or international legal motivations. 
The Shape of Protest in Repressive Systems 
We know that people do organize in authoritarian countries, often in the face of severe 
repression. When opposing groups protest under these circumstances, chances are 
good that violence will be one of the tactics used. Why is violence seemingly endemic 
to social movements in authoritarian systems? Four interrelated dynamics are operative 
here. First, the authorities themselves use violence. As Anderson stated, regimes often 
produce the opposition movements they deserve.18 Opposition groups tend to mirror 
                                                                        
14 Karl-Dieter Opp and Wolfgang Roehl, “Repression, Micromobilization, and Political 
Protest,” Social Forces 69:2 (1990). 
15 Ronald A. Francisco, “The Relationship between Coercion and Protest: An Empirical 
Evaluation in Three Coercive States,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 39:2 (1995). 
16 Mohammed M. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003). 
17 Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982). 
18 Lisa Anderson, “Lawless Government and Illegal Opposition: Reflections on the Middle 
East,” Journal of International Affairs 40:2 (1987): 228. 
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the organization and tactics of the authorities, a tendency called isomorphism. Nelson 
Mandela, when offered freedom in return for his renunciation of violence, refused: 
only when the South African government renounced it, he stated, would he do like-
wise.19 
Indiscriminate repression creates a sense of injustice among the population, but on 
a more concrete level it spreads the justified fear of being imprisoned, even among 
those engaged in non-violent activities. This fear has driven many a peaceful activist 
underground, removing any incentive for moderation or non-violent action in the proc-
ess. Joining a terrorist organization, Della Porta states, is often a result of non-terrorist 
activism.20 In Northern Ireland, peaceful protesters became violent when they saw that 
their non-violent activism was useless—the authority and its repression were deemed 
illegitimate, and activists feared the effect of repression on themselves or those close to 
them, friends or family.21 In fact, one of the only common elements in the individual 
background of terrorists is their radicalization at the hands of state authorities, either 
through pitched battles or imprisonment.22 
Second, authoritarian states do not always abide by universal principles, such as 
those enshrined in international laws like the Geneva Conventions. If the authorities 
have no qualms in using overwhelming force, sit-ins and non-violent protests will most 
likely be quashed without achieving even the publicity an unsuccessful demonstration 
in a democracy would likely yield. Non-violent collective action becomes meaningless. 
The boundary between violence and non-violence becomes blurred: according to 
Seidman, the rational choice to use passive tactics is conditional upon the oppressor’s 
response.23 As the statement by Mandela referenced above illustrates, clear-cut moral-
ity—the difference between what is right and wrong—becomes unclear to protestors 
when the state responds violently against all forms of protest. In the end, state repres-
sion decreases the occurrence of non-violent protest activities while increasing violent 
ones.24 
Third, when opposition itself is outlawed, challengers are pushed toward advocat-
ing revolution and not reform, since the system will not accommodate any changes or 
                                                                        
19 Keeley, “Trying to Define Terrorism,” 39. 
20 Donatella Della Porta, “Introduction: On Individual Motivations in Underground Political 
Organizations,” in Social Movements and Violence: Participation in Underground Organi-
zations, ed. Donatella Della Porta (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, Inc., 1992), 16. 
21 Robert W. White, “From Peaceful Protest to Guerrilla War: Micromobilization of the Provi-
sional Irish Republican Army,” American Journal of Sociology 94:6 (1989). 
22 Youth is the other main common characteristic. Della Porta, “On Individual Motivations.” 
The sociological process of stigmatization is a related dynamics at work in these circum-
stances. 
23 Gay W. Seidman, “Blurred Lines: Nonviolence in South Africa,” PS: Political Science & 
Politics 33:2 (2000). 
24 Mark Irving Lichbach, “Deterrence or Escalation? The Puzzle of Aggregate Studies of 
Repression and Dissent,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 31:2 (1987). 
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oppositional activism.25 As protest is criminalized, politics become polarized, turning 
the game from a multi-sided one into a binary affair, where one must be “for or 
against” the state. Sides must be chosen. Fence-sitting becomes increasingly difficult as 
state repression intensifies. Akin to the desire to “throw the bums out,” oppositional 
dynamics in non-democratic settings translate into support for whatever challenger 
withstands the period of repression. It does not, however, necessarily indicate popular 
support for that opposition’s agenda. 
Fourth, mobilization processes under authoritarian systems propel opposition 
movements to transform themselves into covert, underground, and exclusive organiza-
tions that are prone to violent tactics. Since organizing is illegal, activists use informal 
and decentralized networks to evade the eyes of the state. Violence is a tactic in gain-
ing movement adherents. To persist and grow, social movements must publicly com-
municate that they represent a committed and organized constituency.26 Denied access 
to avenues of legal demonstration, a violent event airing on the evening news fills the 
advertising bill. Furthermore, without access to public spaces, mobilization efforts of-
ten turn to religious ones, since these are difficult to repress completely.27 Identity 
markers of social movement identification will likewise be affected. Opinions that 
cannot be voiced overtly will instead find expression through symbols. Styles of 
dress—a particular form of veiling, or a kaffiyeh—take on strong political meanings in 
authoritarian contexts.28 
In all cases, the actions of the authorities have a significant impact on opposition 
groups in terms of the techniques used, the ideologies drawn upon, and the collective 
identifications that are used to solidify the movement. The idea that opposition groups 
can be analyzed without reference to the authorities cannot be sustained. Challengers 
do not exist in a vacuum. Not only their development, but also their current strategies 
and tactics are affected by the configuration of actors and institutions with which they 
                                                                        
25 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 2nd ed. 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 85. Anderson quotes Robert Dahl: “Opposi-
tion that would be loyal if it were tolerated becomes disloyal because it is not tolerated.” See 
Lisa Anderson, “Fulfilling Prophecies: State Policy and Islamist Radicalism,” in Political 
Islam: Revolution, Radicalism, or Reform?, ed. John L. Esposito (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rien-
ner, 1997).  
26 Tilly, “From Interactions to Outcomes in Social Movements,” 157. 
27 Using religious forums to organize grievances also mitigates against distinctions based on 
class or markers characteristic of groups involved in more typically recognized civil-society 
organizing. The place dictates the identity invoked in collective organizing, to a large degree. 
Gatherings in a church or mosque will draw the community sharing that particular belief, a 
group that will include multiple social classes and conflicting economic interests.  
28 On women’s dress in the Muslim world, see Fadwa El Guindi, Veil: Modesty, Privacy and 
Resistance (New York: Berg, 1999); Arlene Elowe Macleod, “The New Veiling and Urban 
Crisis: Symbolic Politics in Cairo,” in Population, Poverty, and Politics in Middle East Cit-
ies, ed. Michael E. Bonine (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1997); Jenny B. White, 
Islamist Mobilization in Turkey: A Study in Vernacular Politics (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 2002). 
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are confronted. That is good news for policy-makers, providing opportunities to alter 
the trajectory of opposition movements. 
Conclusion: Who Fears Islamists in Parliament? 
Democratic inclusion can greatly decrease the incentive to use violent tactics, by pro-
viding opportunities to moderate political entrepreneurs and drawing support away 
from radicals. When radicals do obtain elective office, they inevitably demonstrate an 
inability to alter the basic institutions any more than their non-radical colleagues, 
thereby de-mystifying their radical ideology in the eyes of the public.29 Advanced 
democratic countries have not been devoid of such challenges, but have withstood 
assault by absorbing some radical groups, de-legitimizing those who stray too far from 
accepted norms, and allowing others to try their hand at obtaining the populace’s elec-
toral approval. The beauty of democratic competition is that many contend for the 
popular vote, and rarely is any populace united, Muslims included. Candidates attempt 
to differentiate themselves from others, splitting the popular vote in the process. Alge-
ria’s infamous elections, if they had been allowed to run their course, would probably 
not have produced a supermajority of the type able to create a new constitution.30 
Is this pure idealism? Would allowing Islamists a role in electoral politics lead to 
the abolition of representative institutions altogether? Are Islamists the exception to 
the rule, since the commitment of at least some Islamist groups to democracy is ques-
tionable? This is precisely the point: democratic institutions foster moderation even 
among radical rejecters of the system. If the level of political liberalization is credible 
and fair, the populace will withdraw support from those militants or radicals who reject 
the system.31 Analyses of terrorist movements affirm the necessity of societal support. 
Otherwise, there is nowhere to hide from police, and communities will not long risk 
their own safety to protect terrorists when other avenues for voicing demands and ob-
taining redress are available. This is why terrorist organizations in democracies do not 
last. Democratic societies curtail the trend at the outset, deterring the production of 
future generations of terrorists.32 
An electoral victory by Islamists is always a possibility. Democracy is a procedural 
system, wherein only the process, not the outcome, is fixed. As countries make the 
transition to a more open political system, they will inevitably experience social pro-
                                                                        
29 David A. Snow, et al., “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement 
Participation,” American Sociological Review 51:4 (1986). Iran demonstrates the populace’s 
disillusionment with radical movements when they finally gain power, as does the example 
of Hezbollah in Lebanon. While support for the latter still exists, it has been limited to a mi-
nority in Lebanon’s representative government.  
30 The success in question here occurred in the first round of a two-round election, and was 
perceived as a protest vote against the ruling government.  
31 Radical refers only to tactics used, such as terrorism or militancy, not to political platforms. 
32 Gurr, “Terrorism in Democracies.” This does not mean an immediate end to all terrorism; 
existing terrorists remain criminal, but the trend will attract fewer new adherents. 
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test. The more closed the system, the more protest and oppositional mobilizing that 
liberalization will produce.33 The situation will be messy. But providing avenues of 
inclusion channels a majority of political entrepreneurs to work within the system, not 
outside it. 
 
                                                                        
33 Tarrow, Power in Movement, 77–8. 
